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Freedom of association is a fundamental right in Australian labour law.  As such, 
employees have been protected from adverse action on the basis of these industrial 
associations and industrial activities by legislation for more than a century. 
A historical analysis of the legislative protection shows that there has also been a 
significant expansion in breadth of the protective provisions, and a shift in the roles 
which unions have played in the industrial relations arena.  The range of activities 
which constitutes industrial activity for the purpose of the protective provisions has 
expanded, as has the scope of actions which an employer may not take against an 
employee on the basis of these activities.  It is submitted that the breadth of both of 
these legislative categories is necessary in order to best protect employees’ freedom 
of association. 
The legislative provisions and judicial application of the causal link between these 
two categories is analysed.  This analysis illustrates two things: the difficulties faced 
by employers by the imposition of a reverse onus of proof and the requirement that 
the prohibited reason need only be one of many reasons for a decision; and the 
difficulty which the courts face in assessing what was in the mind of a decision 
maker at the time they made their decision. 
These difficulties in the application of the causal link are particularly apparent in two 
situations: when an employee union representative who is particularly active and has 
caused significant irritation to their employer is dismissed or disciplined for an 
apparently unrelated reason; and when a  single  act of an employee union 
representative could be classified as the act of a union representative, or as the act of 
an unsatisfactory employee. 
Finally, a number of potential solutions to this problem are analysed.  The most 
effective of these is the suggestion that the loyalty which an employee union delegate 
owes to their union be determined to override their duty of loyalty to their employer.  
This has the potential to provide certainty to both the employer making the decision 
to take action and the employee in deciding whether or not to take a particular action.  
Furthermore, it does so while still protecting an employee’s fundamental right to 
freedom of association.  
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I  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of labour law is most famously stated by Otto Kahn-Freund, who said 
that it was ‘to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining 
power  which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship’.
1  
Trade union protection provisions are intended to protect employees in their attempts 
to counter the power imbalance that exists between employees and employers.
2  
They do this by protecting employees’ ‘freedom of association’, allowing workers to 
form trade unions and use their collective strength to further their objectives.
3  The 
purpose of the provisions is to ‘remove fear of adverse action by an employer against 
an employee taking union office and performing the functions of that office’
4  and to 
‘ensure the threat of dismissal or discriminatory treatment cannot be used by an 
employer to destroy or frustrate an employee’s right to join an industrial association 
and to take an active role in that association to promote industrial interests of both 
the employee and the association’.
5  
For more than a century, employment law in Australia has recognised the importance 
of role that industrial associations play in the representation of employee rights, and 
has recognised the importance of the right of employees to join such organisations.  
Since 1904, legislation has prohibited employers in Australia from treating an 
employee adversely by reason that they are associated with an industrial 
organisation.
6  These protective provisions began as a protection from dismissal for 
employees who were officers or members of an industrial organisation or who were 
entitled to the benefit of an industrial agreement or award.
7  Over the course of the 
century,  these provisions have  become broader, protecting a wider range of 
employees and prohibiting a wider range of detrimental actions by employers.  
Today, the primary legislation for employment law in Australia is the Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth) (‘Fair Work Act’).  The object of the Fair Work Act is stated to be ‘to 
provide a balanced framework for cooperative and productive workplace relations 
                                                           
1 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Stevens & Sons, 2
nd ed, 1977) 6. 
2 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 527. 
3 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 6. 
4 Bowling v General Motors Holden (1975) 8 ALR 197, 210 (Smithers and Evatt JJ). 
5 Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 165 ALR 550, 583 (Wilcox and 
Cooper JJ). 
6 The first provisions appeared in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). 
7 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 9(1). 2 
 
that promotes national economic prosperity and social inclusion for all’.
8  Among 
other things, this balance is said to be achieved by providing laws which are flexible, 
fair, promote productivity and economic growth and take into account Australia’s 
international labour obligations,
9 and by enabling fairness and representation at work 
by the recognition of the right to freedom of association.
10   
Freedom of association is protected by Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act.  In particular, 
s 346 prohibits an employer from taking ‘adverse action’ against an employee 
because that person is an officer or a member of an industrial association or because 
he or she engages, proposes to engage or has engaged in industrial activity.
11  The 
Fair Work Act, in seeking to provide balance, has abolished the sole or dominant 
reason test, has removed the cap on damages and has extended the definition of 
industrial activity. 
However, it has been argued that the current legislative provisions are too broad and 
do not strike a fair balance between the rights of employees and those of employers.  
More specifically, it is suggested that  the potential scope of  s 346 and other 
associated provisions is so broad that they cannot operate with certainty.  As a result, 
the rights of employers to make decisions regarding their workforces have been 
adversely affected and employees with union associations are unjustifiably protected 
in their employment to the extent that they are effectively ‘untouchable’.
12  The 
‘countervailing force’ of labour law has become stronger than the power of 
employers and it is becoming difficult for the courts to determine where the scope of 
protection ends. 
This thesis will examine the provisions of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits 
employers from taking adverse action against employees because of the employee’s 
union membership or activity.  It will comprise a detailed analysis of the provisions 
and the various cases which have determined and illustrated the ambit and operation 
of this legislative protection.  This paper demonstrates  that the legislative 
                                                           
8 Fair Work Act (2009) (Cth) s 3. 
9 Ibid s 3(a). 
10 Ibid s 3(e). 
11 Ibid s 346. 
12 John Wilson, ‘Handle With Care: Action Against Employees Who are Also Union Delegates’ 
(2011) 220 Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory 8, 8; 
Joellen Riley, ‘Adverse Action Claims under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth): Some Lessons from the 
Early Cases’ (2011) 25(3) Commercial Law Quarterly 12, 15. 3 
 
mechanism,  as it currently operates, does not provide sufficient certainty for 
employees and is not best suited to strike the balance that is required by the 
objectives of the Act.  It will be shown that the most problematic aspect of the 
legislative prohibition against adverse action taken for proscribed purpose, namely an 
industrial association or action, is the causal nexus between the adverse action and 
the proscribed purpose.  Various possible solutions will be discussed by which the 
prohibition may be more effectively implemented. 
I will be analysing the application of the provisions in three parts: the scope of what 
constitutes industrial activity for the purpose of the protection provisions; the scope 
of what constitutes adverse action; and the application of the causal link requirement 
by the courts. 
First, I will describe the history of the legislative protection of employees’ rights to 
industrial associations in Australia, culminating in the Fair Work Act.  This history 
shows  a  continuous progression in the scope of the types of activities and 
associations which are protected.  This historical analysis highlights that the broad 
scope of the provisions cannot be attributed entirely to the Fair Work Act; these 
provisions have been getting broader with each iteration of labour legislation.  It will 
also show how the role of trade unions in Australia has become more diverse over 
time and thus for the provisions to operate effectively to protect freedom of 
association, it is necessary for the legislation to provide protections in a wide range 
of circumstances.   
Secondly, I will look at the legislative provisions which define the kinds of acts 
which, if done for a proscribed reason, will contravene the protection provisions.  I 
will also look in detail at the historical progression of this section and how it has 
been interpreted by the courts.  This will show how adverse action has progressed 
from merely being dismissed from employment to an exceptionally broad range of 
adverse acts and will analyse the reasoning behind this progression.  It will be seen 
that the wide scope of adverse action is necessary in order to protect the rights of 
employees, as the benefit of work extends beyond financial gain to self respect and 
personal fulfilment. 
I will then look at the Fair Work Act provisions which relate to the application of the 
protection provision.  Once it has been established that an employee falls into a 
category  of  industrial  protection, and that adverse action has been taken against 4 
 
them, it must be established that the action was taken because of the proscribed 
reason.  This step is often referred to as the causal link.  It is in the court’s 
application of this causal link where the problems with the scope of the protective 
provisions become apparent.  This is because the acts of an employee who is 
associated with a union can often be characterised in two ways; the act of a good 
union official or the act of an unsatisfactory employee.  The scope of the legislative 
provisions is such that an employee union representative can potentially be protected 
from adverse action for any act connected to their industrial association.  I will also 
analyse in detail the effect that the recent High Court case of Bendigo Regional 
Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay
13 has had on the application 
of the causal link and the apparent difficulties in dissociating an employee’s union 
capacity from their capacity as an employee.   
Finally, I suggest a number of possible solutions to this problem.  As the difficulty 
lies in the judicial application of the test in relation to employees who hold the dual 
role of union representative and employee, each of the suggested solutions is a 
method which could be used by the judiciary in reconciling these  two opposing 
positions.  The first is a determination as to which loyalty overrides which: the 
loyalty an employee owes to their employer, or the loyalty a union delegate owes to 
their union.  The second is an extension of a test which is applied in a discrete area of 
freedom of association law, called the reason / factor distinction.  The third and final 
mechanism is a finding as to whether a comparison should be made between a non-
union affiliated employee and a union affiliated employee, similar to that of anti-
discrimination law. 
 
   
                                                           
13 [2012] HCA 32. 5 
 
II  LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES ENGAGING IN 
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES 
A  History 
As we have seen, the need to provide legislative protection of employees’ freedom to 
form trade unions and use their collective strength has long been recognised  in 
Australian law.
14  The purpose of such provisions is to ‘remove fear of adverse 
action by an employer against an employee taking union office and performing the 
functions of that office’
15 and to ‘ensure the threat of dismissal or discriminatory 
treatment cannot be used by an employer to destroy or frustrate an employee’s right 
to join an industrial association and to take an active role in that  association to 
promote industrial interests of both the employee and the association’.
16  
These provisions were  first implemented in Australia  in the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) (‘Conciliation and Arbitration Act’) and have been a part 
of Australian labour law ever since.  Each of the acts which followed the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Industrial 
Relations Act’), the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘Workplace Relations Act’) 
and the Fair Work Act have contained equivalent provisions.  They form one of the 
most fundamental parts of Australian labour law, protecting employees in their right 
to form associations with unions and in their right to take industrial action. 
As will be seen, there have been fundamental changes to both labour law generally 
and the role of unions specifically.  Australian labour law have evolved from a 
system of compulsory arbitration to one which is focussed on enterprise bargaining, 
and unions have played a crucial role in all systems.
17  Moreover, the nature of their 
role is still one which is considered by legislators as requiring protection.  The 
relationship between employers and employees with industrial association is still one 
which generates a lot of conflict.
18  However, rather than the reactive, antagonistic 
role which unions were required to play during the system of compulsory arbitration, 
                                                           
14 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 6. 
15 Bowling v General Motors Holden (1975) 8 ALR 197, 210 (Smithers and Evatt JJ). 
16 Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 165 ALR 550, 583 (Wilcox and 
Cooper JJ). 
17 John Wilson, ‘Handle With Care: Action Against Employees Who are Also Union Delegates’ 
(2011) 220 Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory 8. 
18 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 2; Shae 
McCrystal, The Right to Strike in Australia (Federation Press, 2010) 56-57. 6 
 
unions are playing a far more interactive and proactive role in ensuring rights for 
workers, which extends throughout all phases of the employment process and thus 
the scope of industrial activities has increased. 
A review of the legislative history of the protection provisions reveals that each time 
the labour relations legislation changed, protections have been afforded to employees 
for a greater range of proscribed reasons, against a greater range of adverse actions.
19  
It will be argued that the scope of industrial activities has extended to a point which 
has created a difficulty for judges in the application of the causal link between an 
adverse act and the industrial associations and activities of an employee. 
1  Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) 
The provisions first appeared in 1904 with the  Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
Conciliation and  Arbitration Act, when the industrial relations arena was 
significantly different to what it is today.  The system of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration  adopted by Australia  was unique amongst almost all industrialised 
societies.
20  Its purpose was to prevent the strikes and lockouts which had plagued 
the industrial relations arena for the previous 20 years.
21  Tribunals were established 
with the power to compel organisations, employees and trade unions to attend 
conciliation conferences in order to resolve disputes.  The result of the conciliation 
conference would be a determination (or ‘award’) which would have the force of 
statute.
22  In practice, rather than turn to the tribunals as a last resort, unions would 
refer disputes early on (and in some cases manufacture artificial disputes
23) in order 
to force management to the bargaining table and to obtain one of these awards, which 
grew into a complex network of minimum conditions which protected the rights of 
employees.
24 
                                                           
19 Elliott v Kodak Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 807, [34]. 
20 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 15. 
21 Alfred Deakin, Member for Ballarat, HOR, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 22 March 
1904, 765; Justice Henry Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order’ (1915) 29 Harvard Law 
Review 221. 
22 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 15. 
23 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte GP Jones(1914) 18 CLR 224.  
24 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 15. 7 
 
The role of unions in the labour relations system as it stood during the time of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act was an antagonistic one.
25  They were responsible 
for bringing interstate disputes, enforcing compliance with awards and were required 
to be involved in collective negotiations.
26  In order to fulfil these roles, they were 
given rights of entry, rights to review the employers’ books and given protections in 
employment.
27  The exercise of these functions and powers ‘was capable of 
generating employer resistance and antagonism’.
28  Unions were a fragile institution 
which many employers were actively opposed to.
  29  Therefore s  9(1) of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act  was brought in to protect employees from 
employers who would seek to undermine this industrial relations system.
30 
This provision originally protected employees from dismissal by reason merely of 
the fact that: ‘the employee is an officer or member of an organisation’; or ‘is entitled 
to the benefit of an industrial agreement or award’.
31  This was in place due to the 
fact that many employers viewed unions as trouble makers.
32  Further, as the only 
employees who were entitled to an award or the benefit of an industrial agreement 
were those associated with the union,
33  employers could  simply dismiss those 
employees to avoid paying the higher wages or providing the better working 
conditions, or avoid attending conciliation altogether.
34  In 1914, the Conciliation 
                                                           
25Australian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Belandra Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 910, [34]; Tess Hardy 
and John Howe, ‘Partners in Enforcement? The New Balance between Government and Trade Union 
Enforcement of Employment Standards in Australia’ (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law 
306, 319.  
26 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 38; Shae 
McCrystal, The Right to Strike in Australia (Federation Press, 2010) 74. 
27 Tess Hardy and John Howe, ‘Partners in Enforcement? The New Balance Between Government and 
Trade Union Enforcement of Employment Standards in Australia’ (2009) 22 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 306. 
28Australian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Belandra Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 910, [34]; Tess Hardy 
and John Howe, ‘Partners in Enforcement? The New Balance Between Government and Trade Union 
Enforcement of Employment Standards in Australia’ (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law 
306, 319. 
29 See for example Cuevas v Freeman Motors Ltd (1975) 25 FLR 67, Pearce v W. D. Peacock & Co 
(1917) 23 CLR 199, 207 (Isaacs J), and Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association v 
International Aviations Service Assistance Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 333. 
30 David Quinn, ‘To be or Not to Be a Member – Is That the Only Question? Freedom of Association 
under the Workplace Relations Act’ (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 5-6; Pearce v W 
D Peacock & Co Ltd (1917) 23 CLR 199, 205 (Isaacs J). 
31 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 9(1). 
32 Cuevas v Freeman Motors Ltd (1975) 25 FLR 67. 
33 Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v Whybrow and Co (1916) 21 CLR 642. 
34 This changed in 1935 after the High Court decision of Metal Trades Employers Association v 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (1935) 54 CLR 387 held that the Arbitration Court had the power to 
make an award which bound employers to provide certain conditions to both union employees and 
non-union employees. 8 
 
and Arbitration Act  was amended to include a third category of protection, 
employees who have appeared as witnesses or given evidence in a proceeding under 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
35 
In 1920, a  fourth category was added, which prohibited an employer from 
discriminating against an employee by reason of the circumstance that the employee 
‘being a member of an organisation which is seeking better industrial conditions, is 
dissatisfied with his conditions’.
36  This category was added in direct response to the 
High Court decision of Pearce v W D Peacock and Co.
37 
In this case, Mr Batchelor was a member of the Federated Engine-drivers’ and 
Firemen’s Association (of which Mr Pearce was the General Secretary).  Mr 
Batchelor was called to his manager’s office and asked if he was dissatisfied with his 
working conditions and was asked to sign a document attesting to his satisfaction 
with his work conditions.  The result of Mr Batchelor signing this would have been 
to stop an arbitration proceeding relating to work conditions with his union and the 
employer in the courts, as he was the only member of the union in his workplace.  Mr 
Batchelor replied that he was not satisfied and refused to sign the document.  His 
employer dismissed him immediately.   
At first instance, the Court of Petty Sessions held that the decision to dismiss Mr 
Batchelor had been based on his employer’s desire not to retain dissatisfied 
employees, rather than on Mr Batchelor’s membership of the union.
38  This was 
upheld on appeal by a majority of the High Court; Barton J on the basis that 
dissatisfaction with wages and conditions is ordinarily grounds for dismissal and it 
should be no different when an employee is a unionist; and Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ 
on the basis that they were unable to review the evidence of the decision maker and 
therefore bound to follow the decision of the lower court.
39 
However, it is the passionately dissenting judgment delivered by Isaacs J that is still 
quoted in cases today and which has become classic statement of the purpose of the 
                                                           
35 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration (No 2) Act 1914 (Cth). 
36 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 9(1)(d); inserted by Act No 31 of 1920. 
37 (1917) 23 CLR 199. 
38 Pearce v W D Peacock & Co Ltd (1917) 23 CLR 199, 199. 
39 See the joint judgement of Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ and the judgement of Barton J. 9 
 
protection provisions.
40  Further, the judgement of Isaacs J, and the other dissenting 
judgement of Higgins J illustrates the difficulties which arise out of the dual 
capacities of an employee who is associated with a union.   
Isaacs J considered that enabling workers to join with a union in order to resolve 
dissatisfaction with working conditions was the very object of the protective 
provisions.  His Honour pointed to the fact that the section was designed ‘to preserve 
organisations so that the method selected by Parliament for settling disputes shall not 
be thwarted’.
41  It was not considered a valid excuse to claim that the decision was 
made because of the employee’s dissatisfaction with working conditions rather than 
because he was the member of a union.  His Honour stated: 
Such an excuse seems to me to have about as much validity as an excuse by a person 
accused of stealing a horse, that he only intended to take the halter, and not the horse 
to which it was attached.  And if in such a case the accused swore that the horse was 
not intended to be taken, but only the halter, and it was no concern of his if the horse 
necessarily followed, and if the Magistrate accepted his explanation and excused him, 
I should nevertheless feel myself bound, sitting in this court of Appeal, to exercise my 
own reason, and notwithstanding the weight justly attaching in proper cases to the 
influence of demeanour of a witness, to say the Magistrate was palpably wrong.
42 
Higgins J, likewise, considered that complaining about work conditions and using 
Federal arbitration to resolve those issues was an intrinsic part of being a member of 
an industrial association and therefore must have been a reason for the decision to 
dismiss Mr Batchelor. 
As stated above, in 1920 the Act was amended to include dissatisfaction with work 
conditions in the definition of what it means to have an industrial association.  This 
amendment negated the majority decision and endorsed the views of the minority, 
expanding  the provisions  in order to better protect freedom of association.  
Employees were now not only protected for belonging to a union, being entitled to 
the benefit of an award, and assisting the union in court proceedings, they were 
                                                           
40 See for example Barclay v the Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further 
Education [2011] FCAFC 14; Elliot v Kodak Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 807; Greater 
Dandenong City Council v Australian Municipal Clerical and Services Union [2001] FCA 349. 
41 Pearce v W D Peacock and Co (1917) 23 CLR 199, 205. 
42 Ibid 206-207. 10 
 
protected for being dissatisfied, and therefore protected for bringing claims to the 
attention of their union for the purposes of relieving this dissatisfaction. 
In 1947, the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was amended again to expand the 
scope of protections to officers of unions as well as delegates and introduced an 
additional category of protection,
43 being protection from dismissal by reason of the 
circumstance that the employee has absented himself from work without leave if: 
(i)  his absence was for the purpose of carrying out his duties or exercising his rights 
as an officer or delegate of an organisation; and  
(ii)  he applied for leave before he absented himself and leave was unreasonably 
refused or withheld.
44 
In 1973, the protective provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act  were 
further expanded by the addition of a fifth category of protection.
45  Employers were 
thus prevented from dismissing an employee by reason of the circumstance that the 
employee  
Being an officer, delegate or member of an organisation has done or proposes to do, 
an act or thing which is lawful for the purpose of furthering or protecting the industrial 
interests of the organisation or its members, being an act or thing done within the 
limits of authority expressly conferred on him by the organisation in accordance with 
the rules of the organisation.
46 
2  Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) 
In 1988, following a review of the federal arbitration system, the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act  was replaced by the Industrial Relations Act.
47  Yet despite the 
change of legislation, the system of industrial relations did not change 
substantially.
48  The protection provisions in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
were largely reproduced in the s 334 of Industrial Relations Act. 
However, in 1993, radical reforms were implemented in the Industrial Relations 
Reform Act 1993  (Cth) (‘Industrial Relations Reform Act’) which recalibrated 
                                                           
43 Act No 10 of 1947. These amendments also renumbered the provisions so s 9 became s 5. 
44 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 5(e). 
45 Act No 138 of 1973. 
46 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 5(f). 
47 Keith Hancock, 1985, Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems, 
Report, Vol 2 (AGOS, Canberra) 
48 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 36. 11 
 
workplace relations and fundamentally altered the objects and operation of the 
legislation.  These amendments saw a fundamental shift in the endorsed role of 
unions and the legislative protection afforded them.  Whereas, under the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act and Industrial Relations Act, the focus of industrial legislation 
had been on providing and overseeing compulsory arbitration scheme, under the 
reformed  Industrial Relations Act it shifted to a system based on enterprise 
bargaining.
49  This new system encouraged management and labour to negotiate 
formal agreements where wages and working conditions were agreed  from the 
outset.
50  The awards which had been set by the previous system remained vitally 
important, as they formed the minimum conditions which could be agreed in the 
enterprise agreements.
51  The objective of this legislation was to lift the 
competitiveness and productivity of Australian workplaces.
52 
It also fundamentally changed the functions of unions.  Instead of battling employers 
in the conciliation and arbitration tribunals, they were negotiating with employers on 
behalf of employees for better wages and conditions from the beginning.  This was a 
more proactive role, involving greater interaction between unions and employers.
53  
Whereas previously the role of the unions was  limited to dispute resolution and 
enforcement of awards, it expanded to agreement negotiation and renegotiation.
54  
3  Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and the Work Choices Amendments 
In 1996, the Industrial Relations Act was replaced with the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth).  Due to a lack of control in the Senate, the intended changes were not as 
strong as they were originally intended to be,
55 and they did not do much more than 
incrementally extend the principles in the 1993 amendment.
56  It was not until 
November 2005 and the enactment of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
                                                           
49 Richard Naughton ‘Ailing into uncharted seas: The role of unions under the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996 (Cth)’ (1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 5. 
50 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 15. 
51 Ibid 39. 
52 Greg McCarry, ‘Industrial Action under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)’ (1997) 10 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 2; Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law 
(Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 39. 
53 Greg McCarry, ‘Industrial Action under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)’ (1997) 10 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 5. 
54 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5
th ed, 2010) 39. 
55 Ibid 42. 
56 Ibid 42. 12 
 
Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (‘Work Choices amendments’) that substantial changes took 
effect.  
These Work Choices amendments caused great concern to employee groups due to a 
reduction in rights and protections for employees and their union representatives.
57  
These reforms were based on the notion that unions were an unnecessary third party 
interference.
58  Unions were actively restricted in their representation of employees 
through new limitations in freedom of entry, restrictions on strike pay, increase in the 
range of injunctions available, prohibition against secondary boycotts and in 
particular the introduction of individual Australian Workplace Agreements.
59  
Most importantly in the context of unionism, was the introduction of Australian 
Workplace Agreements (‘AWAs’).  AWAs were individual agreements which could 
be negotiated between the employee and the employer to the exclusion of the 
applicable award.
60  This meant that the awards which had been worked for over the 
previous 90 years were rendered nugatory.  The legislation also subverted the 
influence of trade unions by  extending  the scope for non-union collective 
agreements.
61   
The introduction of the concepts of enterprise bargaining and individual employment 
contracts represented a further shift away from the system of centralised compulsory 
arbitration.  AWA’s did not have the uptake which it was proposed they would have-
meaning that unions still played a major role in making agreements.
62  However, 
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this, operating together with the other restrictions on unions has had a significant 
impact on the role which unions have performed since 1904.
63   
As might be expected, the philosophical shift that was effected in the Workplace 
Relations Act was echoed in changes to the protection provisions.  The protection 
afforded to unions and of employees freedom to associate in unions was diluted.  
Actions which had formerly constituted criminal offences were sanctioned only by 
civil penalty provisions.
64  Furthermore, protections against victimisation on the 
grounds of non-membership of a union were added to the protection provisions.
65  
Although this addition was not for the benefit of unions, it had the effect of further 
expanding the scope of the industrial association protection.   
These changes were controversial and they were met with much resistance from 
unions, employee groups and the Federal Opposition (at that time, the Labor Party).
66  
The public perception of the legislation was that it was ‘tilted’ in favour of the 
interests of the business community,
67  with restrictions on the capacity of trade 
unions to take action on behalf of employees and with the immunity of companies 
with less than 100 employees from unfair dismissal laws.
68  This (real or perceived) 
loss of protections for employees is what is credited as being the reason for the defeat 
of the Howard Government two years later.
69 
4  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) 
The political response to the public concerns over these amendments came in the 
form of the Fair Work Act, which restored many of the old protections and extended 
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many rights.
70  The political campaign in the lead up to the legislation emphasised 
the need to ‘restore balance’ and swiftly ‘fix the state of Australian labour law.
71   
The Fair Work Act is the current industrial relations legislation.  There is no longer 
any provision for the conciliation or arbitration of disputes, expect in the context of 
certain bargaining disputes.
72  The old award system, however, is important in setting 
the minimum standards by which an employee may be employed.
73 
Unions were extended rights and privileges significantly greater than those which 
existed under the Workplace Relations Act, and even the previous acts.  The abolition 
of individual agreements, the enactment of good faith bargaining principles  in 
collective bargaining negotiations, and the inclusion of the requirement that 
bargaining representatives must not undermine the rights of freedom of association 
all strengthened the unions’ position during negotiation periods.
74  Also extended 
was the union right of entry, including the right to inspect books and call meetings of 
employees.
75  Although these changes do not directly affect the protections against 
adverse action because of an industrial activity, they extend the influence which 
unions have within organisations, therefore increasing the scope of situations in 
which an employee with union associations may be said to be taking part in an 
industrial activity. 
B  The Current Provisions  
The current protections for employees on the basis of their industrial association are 
found within the General Protection provisions of the Fair Work Act.
76  Section 346 
provisions that it is unlawful for a person to take ‘adverse action’ against another 
person on the grounds of their ‘industrial activities’.
77   
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These provisions were intended to correct the imbalance of power, by promoting 
‘fairness and representation at the workplace through streamlined and simple general 
protections dealing with workplace and industrial rights, including the rights to 
freedom of association and protection against discrimination, unlawful termination 
and sham arrangements’.
78  The Fair Work Act altered the format and ordering of the 
provisions, taking what was a ‘bewildering array’
79  of protective provisions and 
reconceptualising them as a prohibition against adverse action on the basis of 
industrial associations and activities. 
1  Proscribed Reasons: Industrial Activities 
Section 346 of the Fair Work Act provides: 
A person must not take adverse action against another person because the other 
person: 
(a)    is or is not, or was or was not, an officer or member of an industrial association; 
or 
(b)    engages, or has at any time engaged or proposed to engage, in industrial activity 
within the meaning of paragraph 347(a) or (b); or 
(c)    does not engage, or has at any time not engaged or proposed to not engage, in 
industrial activity within the meaning of paragraphs 347(c) to (g). 
Section 347 of the Fair Work Act provides: 
A person engages in industrial activity if the person: 
(a)    becomes or does not become, or remains or ceases to be, an officer or member 
of an industrial association; or 
(b)    does, or does not: 
(i)    become involved in establishing an industrial association; or 
(ii)    organise or promote a lawful activity for, or on behalf of, an industrial 
association; or 
(iii)    encourage, or participate in, a lawful activity organised or promoted by 
an industrial association; or 
(iv)    comply with a lawful request made by, or requirement of, an industrial 
association; or 
(v)    represent or advance the views, claims or interests of an industrial 
association; or 
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(vi)    pay a fee (however described) to an industrial association, or to someone 
in lieu of an industrial association; or 
(vii)   seek to be represented by an industrial association; or 
(c)    organises or promotes an unlawful activity for, or on behalf of, an industrial 
association; or 
(d)    encourages, or participates in, an unlawful activity organised or promoted by an 
industrial association; or 
(e)    complies with an unlawful request made by, or requirement of, an industrial 
association; or 
(f)    takes part in industrial action; or 
(g)    makes a payment: 
(i)    that, because of Division 9 of Part 3-3 (which deals with payments 
relating to periods of industrial action), an employer must not pay; or 
(ii)    to which an employee is not entitled because of that Division. 
The concept of ‘lawful industrial activity’ has been extended to include ‘representing 
or advancing the views, claims or interest of an industrial association’.
80  It is 
important to note that the employee does not need to be a member of this association.  
This extension has been criticised as being at odds with the duties that an employee 
owes to their employer.
81  An employee has the potential to create much 
embarrassment to their employer in the course of representing the claims of their 
industrial association.
82  This is one of the categories of protection which is causing 
difficulties for judges in determining whether a decision was made for a particular 
reason.  The court must determine whether the employee was disciplined because 
they caused embarrassment to the employer, or because they were representing the 
views of the industrial organisation.  The two loyalties (as will be explored further 
below) are intertwined.   
The provisions now also include registered and unregistered bodies, and formally 
and informally formed associations of employees.
83  This is a further expansion and 
would alter the outcome of Hyde v Chrysler (Australia) Ltd
84 if it were heard today.  
The key issue in that case was that an employee was made redundant because he had 
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been advancing the views of an informal group of employees who were considered to 
be trouble makers.  
Northrop J held a company is entitled to dismiss employees who come within the 
category of troublemakers.  His Honour  referred to the High Court decision of 
General Motors Holdens Pty Ltd v Bowling
85  and stated that the protective 
provisions are ‘not designed to afford a protection to the employee for his activities 
which fall outside his authority as an officer of the organisation’.
86  As the employee 
was not authorised as an officer of an organisation, he was not entitled to the 
protections of the Act. 
With the new change, Mr Hyde would be protected from dismissal, as he had been 
acting on behalf of an informal  industrial organisation.  The ‘trouble’ which Mr 
Hyde was creating was on behalf of an unregistered union.  In this way, to discipline 
him for acting as a trouble maker would be to discipline him in his ‘industrial 
activities’, which by the current legislation is a breach of the Act.  
These amendments and expansions clarify the scope which the provisions protecting 
industrial associations are intended to cover.
87  Today, the prohibition against 
adverse action because of an employee’s union association refers not only to the 
limited fact of union membership, but to the broader concepts of what activities and 
values are incorporated in union membership.
88  For example, protection on the basis 
of union membership has been held to include the right to have terms and conditions 
of employment regulated on a collective basis.
89  Even before it was expressly 
legislated against, it had been accepted that the freedom of association rights extend 
to more than merely the right to join or not join a union, but that the purpose of the 
provisions need to be considered.
90 
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2  Proscribed Reasons: Workplace Rights 
Another category of protection within the General Protection provisions, which does 
not directly relate to industrial organisations but has the potential to provide greater 
protection for unions in their functional capacity, is that of ‘workplace rights’.  This 
concept of workplace rights is unique to the Fair Work Act
91 and is certainly an 
extension of the protections provided for in previous acts.
92   
These provisions  provide an additional avenue of protection.  For example, 
s 341(1)(a) provides employees with protections if they are entitled to the benefit of, 
or have a role or responsibility under, a ‘workplace law, workplace instrument or 
order made by an industrial  body’, which can protect the rights of employees 
obtained through union negotiations.  This can also protect employees who have 
responsibilities as a union representative.  
Further, s 341(c)(i) provides protections for employees who are able to make a 
complaint or inquiry to a person or body having the capacity under a workplace law 
to seek compliance with that law or workplace instrument, and s 341(ii) protects any 
employee able to make a complaint or inquiry in relation to their employment.  As 
‘workplace law’ is defined to include the Fair Work Act itself,
93 this also increases 
protections for union officials who seek to make complaints about rights and wages.  
It is important to note that s 341(ii) does not specify who the complaint should be 
made to, so includes complaints made to unions, and even other employees.
94 
A detailed analysis of the ‘workplace rights’ section of the General Protection 
provisions is beyond the scope of this paper.  However it is important to note that the 
protections extended to employees with industrial associations is not necessarily 
limited to that specific section of the General Protection provisions.  There is the 
potential for further protections to be extended if these workplace rights provisions 
are utilised. 
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C  Conclusion 
As demonstrated above, the role which unions have played in the industrial relations 
arena has become more varied as this area has progressed.  During the time of the 
compulsory arbitration system, unions played a role which was reactive and 
antagonistic, reporting and in some instances creating disputes in order to secure 
better wages and conditions for their members.  As such, their members were 
protected from dismissal by reason of their membership, or by reason of their 
entitlement to their award.  This situation has evolved over the last century, and now 
unions play are more varied role.  Unions are endowed with many rights and 
privileges, which allow them to work with with organisations for the benefit of all 
workers.  As such, the definition of what constitutes an industrial activity for the 
purpose of the protection provisions is also very broad. 
It is not my contention that this scope should be reduced.  The broader the scope of 
this provision, the better protected employees will be if and when they chose to 
participate in industrial activities.  It is my contention that the scope of this provision, 
together with the scope of the definition of adverse action, as will be discussed 
further below, is contributing to the difficulties in the application of the causal link 
between an employee’s industrial activities and the adverse action which is allegedly 
taken against them.   
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III  Adverse Action 
An employer may not take ‘adverse action’ against an employee because of that 
employee’s industrial activities.
95  The definition of ‘adverse action’ is  found  in 
s 342.
96  Adverse action by an employer against a current employee is defined as 
dismissal, prejudice in employment, injury to employment and/or discrimination, and 
includes threatening to take such action.
97  This means that an employer may not do 
such things as  stand an employee down on full pay,
98  raise their voice at the 
employee,
99 or deny an employee a wage increase,
100 for a reason that is prohibited 
in the Act. 
A  History 
As we have seen,
101 the reasons for which an employer may not take action (within 
the category of industrial activities)  have steadily expanded over the years.  In 
addition, the range of actions which employers are prohibited from taking has also 
expanded since its inception.   
The Commonwealth Parliament originally only legislated to protect employees being 
dismissed on the basis of their union affiliation.
102  Subsequently, the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act  was amended in 1914 to include the additional prohibitions 
against: 
b)  Being caused injury in their employment; and 
c)  Having their employment altered to their prejudice.
103 
These provisions were added to the Act to overcome a situation in which an 
employer did something short of dismissing an employee, but which could still be 
said to be harmful to the employee.
104  There are many situations, as will be seen 
below, where an employer could exercise undue pressure on an employee without 
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going to the extent of dismissal.  In 1988, the Industrial Relations Act provided for 
two additional prohibited acts: refusing to employ a person because of their union 
affiliation and discriminating against an employee because of their union 
affiliation.
105 
B  The Current Provisions 
These prohibited acts were consolidated by the Fair Work Act in the one prohibition 
against ‘adverse action’.
106  The phrase ‘adverse’ action’ is new to legislation, but 
has been used in case law to describe the various actions of employers which can 
contravene the Act since the time of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
107  Under 
the Fair Work Act, the prohibition extends to organising or even threatening to take 
adverse action.
108  The definition of adverse action is set out in a table in s 342(1) of 
the Fair Work Act, according to which adverse action by an employer against an 
employee occurs if the employer: 
(a) dismisses the employee; or 
(b) injures the employee in his or her employment; or 
(c) alters the position of the employee to the employee’s prejudice; or 
(d) discriminates between the employee and other employees of the employer.
109 
It was acknowledged in the Explanatory Memorandum that the consolidation of the 
provisions will protect persons against ‘a broader range of adverse action’.
110  The 
Explanatory Memorandum uses the example that under s 659(2)(e) of the Workplace 
Relations Act an employee was only protected from being dismissed because they 
had participated in proceedings against their employer, but under these provisions 
they are protected from the full range of adverse action, including threatening to take 
adverse action.
111  
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The scope of  adverse action was also expanded by the additional category of 
‘discrimination’.
112  This in itself extends the potential scope of adverse action, 
although the extent to which it does this is unclear, because discrimination is not 
defined in the Fair Work Act and it is yet to be judicially tested. 
C  Judicial Application  
The oldest prohibited action and the paradigm example of an ‘adverse action’ is that 
of dismissal.
113  This not only includes actual dismissal, but constructive dismissal, 
which incorporates situations where an employee resigns but was forced to do so 
because of the conduct of their employer.
114 
However, it is clear that ‘adverse action’ includes actions that fall short of dismissal.  
Subsection (b) of the definition of adverse action refers to injury to employment, 
which  involves the infliction of compensable harm.
115  It does not refer only to 
financial injury, or deprivation of rights, but to ‘any circumstances where an 
employee in the course of his employment is treated substantially differently from 
the manner in which he or she is ordinarily treated and where that treatment can be 
seen as injurious or prejudicial’.
116     
In Squires v Flight Stewards Association of Australia,
117 the injury to employment 
complained of was standing the employee down on full pay.  In Health Services 
Union of Australia v Tasmania,
118  the  injury occurred when the employee was 
singled out by being denied a wage increase.  Both of these actions amounted to an 
‘injury to employment’. 
Prejudicial alteration of an employee’s employment position  is prohibited by 
subsection (c) of s 342(1).  It has been defined as a ‘broad additional category which 
covers not only legal injury but any adverse affection of, or deterioration in, the 
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advantages enjoyed by the employee before the conduct in question’.
119  For 
example, a conversation which involved raised voices and a lack of patience has 
been held not to amount to an injury to employment, but would have amounted to a 
prejudicial alteration of the complainant’s position.
120  This is in recognition of the 
fact that fear of alteration of any of the terms or of the entitlements of the 
employment contract ‘would be as potent a factor inhibiting an employee from 
operating the Act as fear of dismissal, or loss of pay or something in the nature of an 
immediate injury’.
121 
The concepts of injury to employment and prejudicial alteration are ‘concepts of 
wide operation’.
122  The deterioration does not have to be direct.  It is sufficient that 
the risk of prejudicial alteration is ‘real and substantial, rather than merely possible 
or hypothetical’, for it to be adverse action.
123  
Under the Fair Work Act, it is not necessary to prove that the employer intended that 
the action would have an adverse affect on the employee.
124  There is ‘nothing in the 
language or context of those provisions to suggest that the adverse action must be ‘an 
intentional act’’.
125  There is no need to prove a mental element in order to establish 
‘adverse action’.  The employer’s intention is relevant only with respect to whether 
that action was ‘because of’ one of the proscribed purposes.
126    Therefore, for 
instance, revoking benefits for all staff can be seen as adverse action against one 
particular staff member.
127 
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D  Conclusion 
Adverse action has been construed very broadly by the courts.  Indeed it is clear that 
suspension, even on full vary, may still constitute adverse action.
128  The courts have 
accepted that the benefits of work extend beyond financial gain and include non 
economic benefits related to self esteem and personal fulfilment.
129  Work gives life 
‘direction and purpose ... with the loss of work comes a loss of dignity’.
130  
Suspension with full pay has been found to be ‘adverse action’ as it deprives the 
employee of the opportunity to work and is demeaning.
131 
The courts have also held that adverse action includes the commencement of 
investigations into alleged misconduct.
132  The commencement of investigations is 
adverse because it exposes the employee to the imposition of a penalty if the charges 
are ultimately proven,
133 and the investigations may have an effect on the employee’s 
reputation and standing among their peers.
134 
Accepting the importance of all aspects of an employee’s position, the breadth of 
adverse action is understandable.  An employer has far greater influence over an 
employee than simply their ability to fire them.  A demotion or a detrimental change 
in work hours may have just as strong an effect.  It is suggested that even with the 
breadth of adverse action today, employers  are finding devious ways of getting 
around union representation,
135 such as getting rid of an entire workforce in Patrick 
Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia
136 or insisting on 
individual agreements in Australian Workers’ Union v BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd.
137  It is 
my argument, as will be discussed below, that it is the extension of this concept, 
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together with the extension of the concept of industrial activity that is creating 
difficulties in applying the test for causation. 
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IV  Causal Link –The Motivation of the Decision Maker 
Once it has been established that an employee falls into the protected category of 
industrial association and activities,  and that they have been subject to adverse 
action, it then falls to the court to determine whether that action was taken because of 
the prohibited reason.  This is sometimes called the causal nexis or causation, but it is 
not causation in the strictly legal sense.
138  The question for the court to determine is 
what was in the decision maker’s mind when they made the decision to take adverse 
action against an employee.
139  This is simply a finding of fact.
140 
However, given that there are such a broad array of activities which can constitute 
industrial activity  and that there is such a low threshold for what constitutes an 
adverse act, the motivations of an employer are particularly difficult to ascertain.  For 
example, if an employer is unaware that the employee is currently acting in an 
industrial capacity and they take adverse action in relation to that employee, have 
they taken that decision for a prohibited reason?  Further, if an employee is an active 
and disruptive union representative who breaches their employment contract in an 
activity unrelated to their union capacity and adverse action is taken, has this action 
been taken because of their breach, or because the employer was looking for reasons 
to be free of that particular worker? 
There are two legislative provisions related to ascertaining the motivations of the 
decision maker.  These are the imposition of a reverse onus of proof in s 361, 
whereby employers must prove that they did not take action for a proscribed reason, 
and s 360, which states that the prohibited reason need only be one of the proscribed 
reasons for a contravention of the Act to be established. 
A  Reverse Onus 
Perhaps the most important feature of this part of the prohibition is that the employee 
is relieved of the onus of proving that the adverse action was taken for one of the 
proscribed purposes.  Instead it is for the employer to prove that his actions were not 
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so motivated.  The onus is on the applicant to establish the objective facts relevant to 
the contravention of the Act;
141 i.e. that they fall within an industrial association 
protection and that adverse action has been taken against them.  However once this 
has been established, the onus shifts to the employer to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that they did not make the decision for a prohibited reason.
142   
The reverse onus of proof has existed since 1914,
143 and is one of the most consistent 
features of this area of law.
144  The imposition of the reverse onus by the legislation 
constitutes a recognition that ‘the circumstances by reason of which an employer 
may take action against an employee are, of necessity, peculiarly with the knowledge 
of the employer’.
145  Without this clause, ‘it would often be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for a complainant to establish that a person acted for an unlawful 
reason’.
146 
The current legislative provision which sets this out is s 361(1), which provides that 
if it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a 
particular intent and taking that action for that reason or with that intent would 
constitute a contravention of that part of the Act, then it is presumed that the action 
was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves 
otherwise.
147 
While there is technically no requirement that the employer give evidence of what 
their actual motivations were, but this evidence is usually crucial to displacing the 
onus of proof.
148    Similarly, there is no requirement that the employee provides 
evidence as to the reasons for the employer’s decision, due to the presumption, but it 
is often the case that this sort of evidence is introduced to increase the strength of the 
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case.
149  This assists the court to ascertain the objective circumstances surrounding 
the decision to take adverse action.  As will be seen below, these objective 
circumstances will be relevant to assessing the veracity of the evidence of the 
decision maker. 
The reverse onus is the source of many complaints from employer groups who feel 
that it is unfair, and makes it too easy for employees and their unions to bring claims 
against the employer, with the employer left to prove otherwise.
150  Many employer 
representatives have called for the reverse onus to be removed entirely.
151  Given the 
breadth of the category of protection and definition of adverse action, it is 
understandable that employers feel that it is easy to bring a claim.  However, it is 
well documented that there is great difficulty in establishing what is in the mind of 
another person.
152  The injustice in removing this provision would outweigh any 
associated relief for the employer.  The  idea of removing the reverse onus was 
considered by the  recent review, Towards More Productive and Equitable 
Workplaces: an Evaluation of the Fair Work Legislation, which concluded that the 
reverse onus is not producing unanticipated results and recommended that it be left 
the way it is.
153 
For many, the reverse onus is not by itself the issue, it is the reverse onus coupled 
with the extensions of the protected categories of employees and the actions which 
are protected against, together with the potentially unlimited range of compensation 
which could be ordered and requirement that the prohibited reason need only be one 
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of the prohibited reasons (discussed further below).
154  The reverse onus has always, 
and necessarily, been a provision which favours employees, because of the inherent 
difficulty in determining what is in the mind of another person.  However, coupled 
with these other factors, it is one of the key provisions which amplifies the 
difficulties faced by employers in the application of this provision. 
B  Multiple Reasons 
Section 360 of the Fair Work Act provides: 
For the purposes of this Part, a person takes action for a particular reason if the 
reasons for the action include that reason. 
Therefore, when determining whether or not the decision maker has acted because of 
a proscribed reason, it is not necessary that the prohibited reason for the decision was 
the only reason.  There may have been many reasons for the employer’s decision to 
take action which adversely affects the employee.  It will be sufficient under the Fair 
Work Act that the proscribed reason is one of those multiple reasons.  This is another 
of the provisions associated with the industrial associations protections which is 
blamed for the apparent imbalance in favour of employees.
155  
It has always been the case that the reason need only be one of the reasons, even 
though it was not always explicitly stated in the legislation.  The Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act did not expressly state whether the reason had to be the only reason 
or not.  However, Isaacs J in his influential dissent in Pearce v W D Peacock and 
Co,
156 held that: 
The provision casting the onus on the defendant employer means that the fact that the 
dismissed employee was a member of an organization must not enter in any way into 
the reason of the defendant, if he desires exculpation.   
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Subsequently, this formulation was rejected by Mason J of the High Court in 
General Motors Holdens Pty Ltd v Bowling
157  as being too extreme.
158  His 
Honour
159 took a more moderate approach, holding that the employee need only 
prove that the prohibited reason or circumstance was a ‘substantial and operative’ 
factor, but did not have to be the ‘sole or predominant factor’ influencing him to 
make that decision.  Mason J considered that this test would enable the court to 
establish the ‘real reason’ for the dismissal.
160  It is this interpretation of s 360 that 
has been followed
161 and now constitutes an accepted interpretation of that provision. 
The requirement that the prohibited reason need only be one of many reasons, so 
long as it was an ‘operative’ reason remained law up until the pre-reform Workplace 
Relations Act.
 162  However, in 2009, a new subsection (4) was introduced into s 792 
by the Work Choices amendments.
163  Section 792(4) provided that an employer did 
not contravene the Act unless the person’s entitlement to the benefit of an industrial 
instrument or an order of an industrial body was the sole or dominant reason for the 
decision.
164 
The test was therefore changed from the ‘substantial and operative factor’ to the ‘sole 
or dominant reason’ test, which placed a greater evidentiary burden on the 
applicant.
165  This subsection made it significantly harder for employees and unions 
to prosecute freedom of association cases.
166  It operated essentially as a defence for 
employers, who simply needed to establish that their action was taken for a range of 
reasons, of which the prohibited reason was simply one.
167 
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This test was short lived, and was rejected by the Fair Work Act, s 360 expressly 
stating that the prohibited reason only needed to be one of many reasons for the 
actions taken.
168  It has been described as a ‘short-term and limited departure from 
the traditional evidentiary burden placed on employers’.
169  It was considered to be 
one of the many ways in which the Work Choices  legislation diminished the 
protections for employees.
170 
However, this test found favour with many employer groups.  In submissions to the 
Fair Work Act Review many organisations recommended that the ‘sole or dominant’ 
reason test be reinstated and incorporated into the Fair Work Act.
 171  The concern for 
employers is that the prohibited reason need only be part of the reason for the 
adverse action, even where other more significant reasons exist, such as misconduct 
or poor performance.
172  They submitted that this would have the effect of evening 
out the imbalance in the current application of these provisions and would provide 
greater clarity.
173 
However, this test reduced the effectiveness of the dismissal provisions.
 174  One of 
the objects of the provision is to protect employees in their associations with unions 
and in their participation in industrial activities.
175  As early as 1917
176  and 
conclusively determined in 1976,
177 the protective provisions have been interpreted 
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to mean that the prohibited reason may not form any operative part of the decision 
making.  To allow an employer to take actions which are adverse to an employee 
because of an industrial association or activity so long as there is another reason for 
the decision does not provide employees with sufficient protections. 
It remains the law today that a prohibited reason need only be one of multiple 
reasons for a decision.  However, it is worth noting that this reason still has to be an 
operative reason, it cannot be a peripheral or potential reason.
178 
C  Judicial difficulty in determining the reasons of the decision maker 
Thus, once the applicant has shown that adverse action was taken against them and 
that they are associated with a union or engaged in industrial activity, it is for the 
employer to prove on the balance of probabilities that the proscribed reason was not 
one of the operative reasons for their decision.  It is this step where the breadth of the 
provisions is making it difficult for judges to make a determination. 
The recent Full Federal Court decision of Barclay v the Board of Bendigo Regional 
Institute of Technical and Further Education,
179 and subsequent High Court case of 
Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay
180 have 
been the pivotal cases  in this regard.  These  cases  illustrated  that, while  it is 
comparatively straightforward to work out whether an act can be classified as an 
adverse act and whether a person falls into the category of a protected person, the 
difficulty lies in determining what was in the mind of the decision maker when they 
made their decision.  This difficulty is exacerbated by the broad scope of the law. 
The difficulty in the application of the causal link is best illustrated when dealing 
with employee union representatives.  This is due to the dual roles which these 
employees are required to play, which in many cases are directly opposed.  In 
particular, the difficulties faced by the courts are best illustrated in two situations: 
where the employee being disciplined is a particularly active union delegate; and 
where a union delegate is forced to choose between their employer and union in the 
performance of a particular act. 
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1  What is the Test for Determining Intent - Subjective v Objective Intention? 
Neither or both? 
Over the years, when the courts have sought to determine what was in the mind of a 
decision maker when they made their decision to take action which was adverse to an 
employee, this determination was made by looking at the subjective intentions of the 
decision maker, i.e. what was actually in their mind at the time they made their 
decision.  The evidence of the decision maker has been critical in this regard.
 181   
The Barclay case created great interest within Australian labour law, as it was the 
first case under the Fair Work Act industrial relations protections to be appealed to 
the Full Federal Court, thus would be the most authoritative statement of the law 
under the new Act.  In what was considered a surprising decision,
182 the Full Federal 
Court held that subjective reasons of the decision maker were only peripherally 
relevant.  The Court held that, in order to appropriately satisfy the objects of the Act, 
the pertinent inquiry ought to be what was the real reason for the decision, with 
reference to the objective circumstances of the case.  On this view, it was possible for 
an employer to make a decision for a prohibited reason without being consciously 
aware of that reason.  This had the effect of dramatically extending the potential 
scope  of the already broad provisions and increasing uncertainty for employers.   
Employers were now required to rebut the presumption that they had taken action for 
reasons that included a prohibited reason, when they may not have been consciously 
aware of those reasons. 
This decision has since been overturned by the High Court  and the subjective 
intentions of the decision maker have been reinstated as the relevant enquiry.   
However, this series of decisions highlights the inherent difficulty in the application 
of the causal link, especially when dealing with employees who also hold the 
position of union representative.   
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(a)  Barclay v the Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further 
Education 
Mr Barclay was the union representative for his workplace.  In that capacity, he sent 
an email to all employees who were members of the Australian Education Union 
which stated that he had received tips from an anonymous source that the Bendigo 
Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (‘BRIT’) were asking 
employees to produce fraudulent and false documents for an audit and that 
employees should not agree to participate in these activities.  It was sent from Mr 
Barclay’s BRIT email account, but was signed as President of BRIT Australian 
Education Union Sub-branch. 
This email came to the attention of Dr Harvey, Chief Executive Officer of BRIT, 
who took the view that it was a breach of the employee Code of Conduct and 
possibly constituted serious misconduct.  She issued a letter asked Mr Barclay to 
show cause why he should not be subject to disciplinary action for the public way he 
raised the allegation, for not bringing the allegation to the attention of managers and 
refusing to provide particulars of the tips he received.  He was temporarily banned on 
full pay from attending BRIT campuses, suspended from using his email account and 
subjected to a disciplinary investigation. 
It was not contested that the actions of Dr Harvey towards Mr Barclay constituted 
adverse action.  Neither was it contested that Mr Barclay held a position as an 
industrial officer and as such fell into a protected category of the Act.  The main 
question at trial was whether the adverse action was taken because of  a reason 
proscribed by the Act.  More particularly, the issue was whether the search for the 
reason for the decision needs to stretch beyond the subjective intention of the 
decision maker, into the objective circumstances, or the unconscious of the decision 
maker. 
(i)  First Instance-A Subjective Approach 
At first instance Mr Barclay relied on the change in the legislation from the phrase 
‘by reason of’ to ‘because of’ and submitted that this changed the existing 
jurisprudence.  He submitted that ‘in determining whether or not prejudicial action 
had been taken ‘because’ of the status or activities of the victim, the actor’s 
subjective reason for taking the prejudicial action was wholly irrelevant and was not 35 
 
to be taken into account.  The test was argued to be purely objective’.
183  The case 
was heard by Tracey J of the Federal Court of Australia.  His Honour considered that 
this construction was ‘inconsistent with the legislative history, relevant principles of 
statutory construction and authority’.
184 
Dr Harvey gave evidence at the hearing and this evidence was cross  examined.  
Tracey J considered that she ‘provided convincing and credible explanations of why 
it was that she took the steps that she did.
185  His Honour found that she was 
concerned  only  about the reputation of BRIT and wished to investigate the 
allegations made in the email.  At no stage had she turned her mind to Mr Barclay’s 
position as a union official.  The case for breach of the freedom of association 
provisions was not made out. 
(ii)  Appeal – An Objective Approach / the ‘Real Reason’ 
This decision was appealed to the Full Federal Court.  Mr Barclay did not challenge 
the factual findings of Tracey J in relation to Dr Harvey’s subjective reasons.  It was 
instead argued that Tracey J erred in law by applying a subjective test, rather than an 
objective test.  In a controversial decision, Gray and Bromberg JJ upheld the appeal 
and agreed that the relevant consideration should be the objective circumstances of 
the case. 
Their Honours took a broad policy approach, relying heavily on the objects of the 
Act, in relation to the provisions protecting freedom of association, the history of the 
provisions and international obligations.
186  Their Honours considered that it was 
‘clear that the provisions are intended to be both facilitative and protective’.
187  They 
referred to the fact that the protection was  designed  not merely to protect  an 
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employee’s right to be a member of a union, but to ensure that employees are free to 
be actively involved in industrial activities.
188 
They agreed with the primary judge that the change from ‘by reason of’ to ‘because 
of’ did not render the subjective intention irrelevant.  However they found that in 
searching for the ‘real reason’ for the actions, subjective reasons were not decisive.  
In fact, the real reason for a person’s conduct may not even be what the decision 
maker genuinely believes they were motivated by.
189  Their Honours considered that 
a subjective enquiry into the mind of an employer may be misleading: 
The search is for what actuated the conduct of the person, not for what the person 
thinks he or she was actuated by.  In that regard, the real reason may be conscious or 
unconscious, and where unconscious or not appreciated or understood, adverse action 
will not be excused simply because its perpetrator held a benevolent intent.  It is not 
open to the decision-maker to choose to ignore the objective connection between the 
decision he or she is making and the attribute or activity in question.
190 
They held that instead that if the objective circumstances of the case were such that it 
appeared on the balance of probabilities that the prohibited reason was one of the 
operative reasons for the decision, then it would be open to the court to find that 
there had been a breach of the provisions.  This would be determinative despite the 
fact that the decision maker may be able to satisfy the court that in their own minds, 
that was not an operative reason. 
Their Honours considered that the circumstances of the case were such that an 
‘objective connexion’ was apparent.
191  Mr Barclay was approached in his union 
capacity with concerns of employees, he sent an email in this capacity to union 
members and he refused to breach the confidence of his fellow employees by giving 
Dr Harvey the names of the people who had initially reported the alleged fraudulent 
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behaviour.  He had been at all times acting in his capacity as a union official and any 
failures were failures in that capacity, not in his capacity as an employee.
192   
They accepted Tracey J’s findings that Dr Harvey had never (consciously) taken into 
account a proscribed reason.  However they held that his Honour had erred in law by 
not finding that the objective circumstances dictated that his role as a union official 
must have been a reason for the decision.  In fact, they then went even further to state 
that where a person is acting in their capacity as a union representative, it is 
impossible  to ignore the connexion, and thus could not be disciplined in their 
capacity as an employee without breaching the protective provisions.
193  
This decision increased the potential scope of the general protection provisions and 
was met with widespread criticism for making union officials a ‘protected 
species’.
194 
Lander J, in dissent, agreed with Tracey J that the ‘subjective intention of the alleged 
contravenor if accepted by the Court to be the actual intention will be 
determinative”.
195  Therefore in the absence of a challenge to Tracey J’s factual 
findings,  his Honour held that there could be  no argument  that BRIT had 
contravened the General Protection provisions.
196  He also expressly disagreed with 
the proposition of Gray and Bromberg JJ that an employee who was acting in their 
capacity as a union representative could not be disciplined without breaching the 
industrial protections. 
(iii)  High Court Decision-  A  Subjective  Assessment  in Light of Objective 
Circumstances 
In September 2012, the High Court upheld BRIT’s appeal, reversed the decision of 
the Full Court and restored the judgement of Tracey J.  Each of the High Court 
justices found that, in determining the reason for taking adverse action, the relevant 
enquiry is into the subjective intentions of the decision maker.  However, it was 
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emphasised that objective circumstances always had, and would continue to be, 
relevant in assessing the evidence of the subjective intention of the decision maker. 
French CJ and Crennan J confirmed that the approach taken by Tracey J at first 
instance was correct.  Once the evidence of the decision maker as to their subjective 
reasons was accepted, on the balance of probabilities, in light of all other evidence, 
then the employer has discharged their onus.
197  Their Honours considered that this 
had been appropriately done by Tracey J and that it was not open to the Full Federal 
Court to dismiss this finding.  They referred to the statutory presumption in s 361, 
and the reverse onus that arises from that provision as evidence of the fact that the 
decision maker’s state of mind will be the central question.
198  Their Honours 
considered that to require an employer to endure a reverse onus of proof in relation to 
facts which are objectively determinable would ‘destroy the balance’ between 
employers and employees which the Act is trying to uphold.
199 
Heydon J agreed that the onus of proof would be discharged once the subjective 
reasons of a decision maker had been accepted by the court.  His Honour described 
the Full Court majority’s approach of looking beyond the proven subjective 
intentions of Dr Harvey to her ‘unconscious reasons’ as ‘indefensible’,
200 and as 
creating an ‘impossible burden on employers’.
201  His Honour considered that the 
‘objective test’ as proposed by the Full Federal Court carried the risk of being 
applied by higher courts as a way to substitute its own view of the matter in 
circumstances where it was not open to them to overturn the finding of fact from a 
lower court.
 202  Tracey J had the opportunity to view Dr Harvey’s evidence in chief, 
cross examination and re-examination.  Heydon J considered that only in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ should a court of appeal substitute their own judgment 
regarding a witness for that of the trial judge.
203 
Gummow and Hayne JJ agreed that the appeal should be allowed and the judgment 
of Tracey J restored.  However, their Honours emphasised that the question of 
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subjective and  objective intentions detracted from the question of what was the 
substantial and operative reason for the decision.  Although the reason is found in the 
mind of the decision maker, ‘the reliability and weight of such evidence was to be 
balanced against evidence adduced by the employee and the overall facts and 
circumstances of each case’.
204  Therefore, in reality, both objective facts and 
subjective intentions were relevant. 
The decision by the High Court provided a certain amount of relief to employer and 
employer representative groups.  The ‘balance’ between employees and employers 
has been somewhat restored.  However we are still left with the situation where the 
definition of industrial activity is broad enough to encompass activities which could 
reasonably be classified as the actions of an unsatisfactory employee.  This continues 
to be an area of law which is creating great uncertainty for both employees and 
employers. 
(iv)  Both: The Search for the ‘Real Reason’ 
Thus now it seems to be clear that the enquiry as to the employer’s reason for taking 
adverse action is an enquiry is into the subjective reasons of the decision maker.  
However certainty in relation to the test to be applied does not necessarily mean that 
there is certainty in the outcome of its application.  The objective circumstances of a 
case have always been taken into account in determining an employer’s motive or 
reason for a decision.
205  Evidence is not considered in a vacuum.
206  The factual 
context in which a decision is made plays a critical role in assessing the employer’s 
evidence as to what was their subjective reason for a decision.  There will be 
circumstances where the evidence of the decision maker does not square with the 
circumstances of that case, and it is within the judicial officer’s discretion to dismiss 
that evidence.  In that way, the ‘real reason’ is established. 
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There have been several instances in which the court has rejected the evidence of 
decision makers in light of the surrounding circumstances.
207  For example, one of 
the considerations which is taken into account is the company’s stance on unions.
208  
In Cuevas v Freeman Motors Pty Ltd,
209 the anti-union attitude of the company was 
considered a relevant factor in dismissing the evidence of the decision maker. 
Furthermore, there is nothing unusual about judges making value judgements about 
the credibility of a witness.  After all, the question of purpose is one of fact, not 
law.
210  Determining causation or purpose in the protection provisions is a common 
sense test,
211  which looks to what, in truth, is in the mind of a decision maker.
212  As 
stated by Isaacs J in Pearce v W D Peacock and Co:
213 
You cannot peer into a man’s mind.  You can only test his statement as to his mental 
attitude by his acts.  And if his acts contradict his verbal statement, then there is reason 
to doubt his testimony, and I think we should use our own judgement on the matter. 
This necessarily means that the factual context of the case will always play an 
important role, especially as an employee’s position as a union delegate ‘cannot be 
easily dissociated’ from their employee capacity
  214    In fact those circumstances 
create a ‘very real possibility that the dismissal was associated with the circumstance 
that that employee was an official or delegate’.
215  The High Court has held this is 
not ‘impossible’, as claimed by the majority of the Full Federal Court in Barclay.  
However it is still uncertain how actions taken in relation to employees who are also 
union delegates will be classified by the courts, due to the intertwined nature of these 
two roles. 
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2  Serving Two Masters: Opposing Loyalties of Employee Union 
Representatives 
Union delegates in the workplace are being asked to perform two seemingly 
incompatible roles: they are to be faithful and productive employees, but they are 
also required to promote the views of the union, to query management as to safety 
and job security and campaign on behalf of the worker.  Sometimes these two roles 
collide and the employee is dismissed or disciplined.  Then the question for the court 
becomes: ‘why was that employee dismissed?  Was it because of their role as a union 
representative?    Or  was it because they were acting in a manner which was 
unacceptable for employees?’  And in circumstances where a delegate does breach a 
workplace law, does the role of union delegate offer that employee a licence or 
protection for that behaviour?’
216 
A union delegate, especially an active representative, will not always be the most 
desirable employee.  Often, the interests of employees are in direct opposition to the 
interests of the employer. They may ‘be responsible for recurring incidents irritating 
to management’,
217 or considered ‘a thorn in the side of the company’.
218  However 
the public utility in the role of unions is considered to be of such importance that 
protections from adverse action are in place.  A person ought to be protected in the 
lawful exercise of their union activities.  The protective provisions which are in place 
create ‘hard rights, and there is no apparent scope for an employer to argue that it is 
unfair that they should be required to tolerate the inconvenient exercise of those 
rights by employees’.
219 
Two situations provide the clearest examples of the difficulties faced in this regard 
by the courts: the first is where a union delegate has been actively and extensively 
involved supporting employee rights, to an extent which the employer considers 
inconvenient; and the second is where a single activity needs to be undertaken by an 
employee who is also a union delegate in which their loyalties to their employer and 
their loyalties to their union collide. 
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(a)  Active Union Delegates 
A union delegate may be involved in many activities in support of the rights of 
employees.  Union delegates who are particularly active are at higher risk of coming 
into conflict with their employers.  For example, the case of General Motors Holdens 
Pty Ltd v Bowling involved a union delegate who was actively promoting a ‘work to 
rule’ campaign, which was affecting the productivity of his employer.  At first 
instance, Smithers and Evatt JJ made the following statement about the issues which 
arise with an active shop steward. 
It is basic ... that active representatives of employees may well incur the displeasure of 
management with consequent risks and worries to those representatives.  As the 
informant in this case said ‘you are brought into the firing line’. Clearly the purposes 
of the Act will be frustrated unless employees are able to act as union representatives 
on the shop floor and elsewhere and negotiate with the representatives of employers 
without fear that on that account they will suffer in their employment.
 220 
An excellent example of this is the case of Cuevas v Freeman Motors Pty Ltd
221 
(‘Cuevas v Freeman Motors’).  Mr Cuevas was a very active union delegate, in a 
workplace that viewed union membership and activities ‘unfavourably’.
222  He was 
vocal in his support of the rights and duties of the defendant and its employees, in 
many instances causing ‘considerable annoyance to the defendant’s management’.
223  
He was ‘distinctly harassed and subjected to pressures unreasonably disproportionate 
to any fault on his part’.
224  For instance, one of the issues which caused strain was a 
ban which had been placed on a tanker which was in the yard to be fixed.  The tanker 
had not been drained of its load of aviation fuel, which Mr Cuevas considered 
dangerous.  He raised the issue with the union who imposed a black ban and the 
tanker was towed away.  This incident cost the company time and money.  Mr 
Cuevas was involved in a number of incidents in support of employees’ rights. 
This is the background against  which his dismissal had  to be considered.  The 
circumstances for his dismissal were this: Mr Cuevas was transferred into a different 
work area after a workplace accident restricted his abilities.  He was not trained in 
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this area and his employers were concerned that he was not working fast enough.  
Management assigned certain people to check over his work.  However, the evidence 
given had a ‘certain unreality about it’,
225  and Smithers and Evatt JJ clearly 
suspected that Mr Cuevas had been being set up.  They rejected the proposition that 
Mr Cuevas was an inefficient worker.   
In relation to the contradictory roles of a union representative, Smithers and Evatt JJ 
stated:  
... There are, of course, active shop stewards and passive shop stewards.  It is apparent 
that an active shop steward may be responsible for recurring incidents irritating to 
management and creating in the mind of the employer a desire to be rid of the 
employee because although otherwise he may be a satisfactory workman, nevertheless 
as a shop steward his capacity for stirring up what the employer regards as trouble is 
to the employer quite intolerable. 
If, in such a case, the employer dismisses the employee not because of any particular 
item of conduct but because of his propensity as such to stir up such trouble then, in 
our opinion, the dismissal must be characterized as a dismissal arising by reason of the 
circumstance that the employee is a shop steward.  In a sense such a dismissal arises 
out of past conduct as a shop steward, but it is more than that.  It is a dismissal to 
escape trouble arising from conduct and situations likely to arise in future out of the 
circumstance that and because the particular employee holds the position of shop 
steward.
226 
This goes directly to the issue of determining the subjective intentions of a decision 
maker when the objective circumstances suggest that the employee’s union capacity 
may have had an effect on the decision.  Notwithstanding that Mr Cuevas’ employer 
was able to point to poor performance as the basis of their decision to dismiss him, in 
light of the circumstances, the court considered that poor performance was simply an 
excuse to get rid of a troublesome union delegate. 
Smithers and Evatt JJ considered circumstances including the anti-union attitude of 
the organisation Mr Cuevas’ record as an active shop steward and the likelihood that 
Mr Cuevas would cause further ‘trouble’ as creating the ‘very strong’ possibility that 
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his industrial association was one of the reasons for the decision to dismiss him.
227  
They concluded that, in the circumstances, ‘it is highly probable that they were 
actuated by a desire to dispense with the services of Mr Cuevas because he was a 
shop steward’.
228 
This case illustrates the difficulty which confronts employers in such circumstances.  
One must ask, could the employer ever safely take the decision to take disciplinary 
action against an employee in Mr Cuevas’ position?  It seems quite possible that, in 
the course of carrying out his role as a union representative, and employee might be 
so disruptive that this must enter the mind of the employer when making a decision 
to take adverse action.  Given the operation of the reverse onus and the requirement 
that the reason need be only one of the reasons for the decision, how can an employer 
ever securely take action against an employee who is also a union representative? 
(b)  Activities where Union and Employment Loyalties Collide 
The second situation where the protective provisions encounter problems is where an 
activity is undertaken for a union purpose, which directly and negatively affects the 
employer.  In this situation, is there scope for discipline?  Or is that activity simply 
too close to any prohibited reason that it must have entered into the mind of the 
decision maker?  The Full Court decision in Barclay,  which held that it was 
impossible to dissociate an employee’s industrial association from their actions if 
that action was in the course of industrial activity, has since been overturned by the 
High Court.  Thus it is possible at law to make a decision to take disciplinary action 
against an employee who has, in participating in industrial activity, simultaneously 
breached an employment obligation. 
However, as has been  seen,  a court may look to the objective circumstances 
surrounding the decision and determine that the testimony of the employer is not 
consistent with the facts and dismiss that evidence.  There is no circumstance in 
which an employer may, with certainty, take action against an employee who 
happens to be taking part in industrial activity. 
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One example of where the  contradiction becomes most apparent is  where 
negotiations for a new contract are on foot.
229  In the case of Finance Sector Union of 
Australia v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,
230 the manager of a bank 
concurrently held the position of President of the state branch of the Finance Sector 
Union (‘FSU’).  A disagreement arose between the FSU and the bank during 
negotiations for a new Certified Agreement.  The bank requested that all bank 
managers promote the bank’s position to their employees and requested that 
managers report to senior management whether their employees would be 
participating in a strike.  Senior managers at the bank felt that Ms Buckland was not 
doing this and instead  was advancing the views of the union.  She  was sent 
clarification letters and a warning letter. 
Wilcox J found that employees are not under an obligation to actively promote the 
views of their employer on contentious issues.
231 ‘She was entitled to her own view 
about those issues and to maintain her integrity in relation to them.  To require her 
actively to promote a position which she regarded as inadequate, and in her capacity 
as an FSU negotiator had already rejected, would be to require her to engage in 
hypocritical deception of her staff’.
232  Wilcox J found that Ms Buckland’s allegation 
of breach of the freedom of association provisions was made out. 
This is a clear example of the way that a union delegate can be placed in a position 
where they must  serve two masters, each of whom  with completely opposing 
interests.  There was no middle ground for Ms Buckland to take, she either supported 
the company position or she supported the union position.  This case seems to 
indicate that where the two loyalties collide, the loyalty to the employer gives way to 
the duties of loyalty to the union. 
Another area of difficulty is where the employee is campaigning publicly outside 
their role in the workplace, but that is affecting the employer.
233  For example, in the 
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case of Bennett v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission,
234 Mr Bennett 
was the federal president of the Customs Officers’ Association and an employee of 
the Australian Customs Service.  He made a number of comments to the media 
concerning the structure of Customs.  He was directed by the company not to make 
any further comments, either in his capacity as an officer of Customs or in his 
capacity as an officer of an industrial organisation.  Mr Bennett did not comply with 
this direction and he was disciplined.  His comments were made in his capacity as a 
trade union official.
235  After examining the circumstances of the case, Finn J 
suggested that the capacity in which Mr Bennett  was acting should be the 
determinant factor and suggested that discipline flowing from this incident would 
have been in breach of the industrial protections.
236 
This decision contrasts with the situation in Barclay.  In that case, the disciplinary 
action taken against Mr Barclay after he sent an email in his industrial capacity, was 
held by Tracey J (and affirmed by the High Court) not to be for a prohibited purpose.  
Implicit in this decision is the assumption that it is possible for an employer to put 
out of their mind this industrial capacity, and view the conduct in the context of their 
capacity as an employee. 
It is submitted  that these divergent decisions indicate an unacceptable degree of 
uncertainty in the law.  An  employer cannot take disciplinary action against an 
employee and be certain that their decision will not be interpreted to be in breach of 
the industrial protection provisions.  Similarly, an employee cannot be certain 
whether an action which they take in support of their union will be interpreted as 
being in breach of their obligations as an employee, or whether that action will be 
protected by the industrial protection provisions. 
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V  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The negative impact of uncertainty in the law is exacerbated by a two additional 
factors.  These are the broad range of penalties available to litigants and the length of 
time which an employee has to bring an action. 
A  Compensation, penalties and other orders 
The impact of uncertainty with respect to the prohibition against adverse actions is 
even greater in view of the extensive range of compensation, penalties and other 
orders that are available against those that breach it.  Unlike the previous versions of 
this protective provision, there is no cap on compensation.
237  Compensation orders 
can include claims for hurt, distress and humiliation.  For example, in Australian 
Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association v International Aviation Services Assistance 
Pty Ltd,
238 an aircraft engineer who lost his job as a result of various adverse acts 
was awarded $84,892.58 plus interest comprising economic loss, loss of wages and 
remuneration and non-economic loss (hurt, distress and humiliation of $7,500). 
Further, the court has the power to order that the company pay penalties for 
breaching this provision of up to $33,000.
239  This penalty may be paid to the 
Commonwealth, to a particular organisation or to a particular person.
 240  
Additionally, the Court is empowered to make ‘any order the court considered 
appropriate’.
241  In Stephens v Australian Postal Corporation,
242 a postal worker was 
reinstated, even though by the time it went to trial, the worker’s employment 
agreement would have expired. 
Many employers claim that they must resort to paying ‘go away money’, whereby 
claims are settled regardless of their merit.
243  There is, of course, no direct evidence 
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of this practice.
244  However there is significant concern among the business 
community.
245 
It should be noted that despite the vast scope for damages, the courts have shown 
themselves to be restrictive with penalties.  In Australian Licensed Aircraft 
Engineers Association v International Aviation Services Assistance Pty Ltd,
246 
pecuniary penalties of only $10,000 were imposed, to be paid to the employee’s 
union, despite the numerous breaches and the calculated and deliberate nature of 
those breaches.
247  In Fair Work Ombudsman v Drivecam Pty Ltd,
248 the Court took 
into account the small size of the business, the rural location, the fact that an apology 
was issued, the lack of prior complaints and the swift response to the investigation 
when imposing a penalty of $1,500 per contravention (instead of a $33,000). 
B  Time Limit 
Furthermore, the length of time allowed to bring an application under the General 
Protection provisions has been extensively criticised.
249  The time limit to bring an 
adverse action claim is 60 days where the adverse action resulted in dismissal and 6 
years where the adverse action did not result in dismissal.
250  This compares to the 
time limit for bringing an unfair dismissal claim, which is only 14 days.
251  
The recent Fair Work Act Review has recommended that the time limit for adverse 
action claims which result in dismissal be reduced to 21 days.
252  However, the Panel 
declined to make any changes to the six year limitation for claims which did not 
result in a dismissal. 
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The six year time limit is not unique to the Fair Work Act, as this is a general 
limitation for any legal action.
253  It is not my intention to debate the necessity for 
this, suffice to note that given the uncertainty which exists in relation to decisions 
relating to union representatives, six years is a long time to have a potential claim 
hanging over an employer’s head.  Furthermore, in the context of a reverse onus, this 
time limit has the potential to make it increasingly difficult for employers to defend 
claims, given the effect that the passage of time has on evidence. 
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VI  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The two legislative categories of industrial activities and adverse action are now so 
broad that it is difficult to ever say with certainty that a prohibited reason was not in 
the mind of an employer when a decision was made.  The High Court decision in 
Barclay  has  diminished some of the anxiety felt by  those involved in industrial 
relations with respect to the test used to determine an employer’s reason for taking 
adverse action.  However, it is still difficult for employers and employees to make a 
secure decision  especially in situations where an employee is also a union 
representative, who often find themselves in a position of conflicting loyalties. 
Where these situations arise, the courts need clarification as to how to reconcile the 
contradictory positions between the rights of an employee to industrial rights and 
associations and the rights of an employer to a profitable business and loyal staff.  
I will discuss in detail below three methods which could be used by the courts in 
order to provide certainty in the application of the causal link.  The first is a 
determination as to which loyalty overrides which: the loyalty an employee owes to 
their employer, or the loyalty a union delegate owes to their union.  The second is an 
extension of a test which is applied in a discrete area of freedom of association law, 
called the reason / factor distinction.  The third and final mechanism is a finding as to 
whether a comparison should be made between a non-union affiliated employee and 
a union affiliated employee, similar to that of anti-discrimination law. 
1  Loyalty an Employee owes to their Employer v Loyalty a Union Delegate 
owes to their Union  
As we have seen, employees who serve as union representatives frequently find 
themselves in circumstances of conflicted duties of loyalty.  Neither the legislation 
nor the case law provides any guidance as to which the employee may or should 
prefer.    In a situation where they are forced to choose between the two, such as in 
contractual negotiations or in public speaking engagements outside their workplace 
which adversely affects their employer, it ought to be clear whether their duties to 
their union outweigh their duties to their employer, or vice versa.   51 
 
All employees owe a common law duty to their employer of loyalty and fidelity.
254  
This duty is interpreted as an implied contractual duty and breach of this duty may 
validly form the basis of a termination.
255  The fact that an employee holds an office 
in an industrial organisation does not alter these obligations to their employer.
256  
Any activities which undermine the duty of loyalty or fidelity owed to an employer 
leaves the employee in breach of their employment contract, whether those activities 
were undertaken in their capacity as an employee or a union representative.
257   
The  freedom of association  provisions  stipulate  that an employer may not take 
adverse action against an employee because  they are associated with a union or 
undertaking union activities.  However an employee may be dismissed for breaching 
their duty of loyalty and fidelity to an employer.  Where it is the employee’s union 
responsibilities  that are  contributing to their failures as a dutiful employee, the 
employer is in the unenviable position that he is unable to securely take the steps that 
he would otherwise take to protect his business by dismissing or otherwise taking 
disciplinary action against the employee. 
However with the breadth of what constitutes adverse action, and the breadth of what 
constitutes an industrial activity, together with the reverse onus of proof and the fact 
that the reason need only be one of the reason for the decision, the probability of a 
decision maker being able to discharge their onus of proof in relation to situations the 
action complained of is actually an industrial action is very low.  It is my submission 
that there must be clear law on which triumphs over the other.  Otherwise union 
representatives are not going to know what to do, and employers are not going to 
know when they have a right to discipline them. 
(a)  Loyalties to an Employer Overriding Loyalties to a Union 
One solution to this apparent contradiction was suggested by the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in their Submission to the Fair Work Act Review.
258  They 
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suggested that the employee’s common law duties, such as the duties of fidelity, 
good faith, trust, to use care etc, be codified, in order to provide clarification to both 
parties as to their rights and obligations.
259  They also suggested that an employee’s 
union role within the workplace should be expressly stated to be subordinate to their 
duties to the employer.
260 
This approach appears to be supported by the High Court decision in Barclay.  The 
Full Federal Court had held that when acting in an industrial capacity, it could not 
objectively be said that the industrial capacity did not form some operative part of 
the reasoning behind the decision to take adverse action.  This point was completely 
rejected by the High Court on appeal.
261  Their Honours upheld the original finding 
of Tracey J, which stated that an employer was entitled to take action against their 
employee for misconduct even if they were acting in an industrial capacity at the 
time.  Union activities were no excuse for Mr Barclay’s failures as an employee.  It 
was found as a matter of fact that the decision maker, Dr Harvey, had not turned her 
mind to his union affiliations at all and that was sufficient to discharge the onus of 
proof against the company. 
(b)  Loyalties to a Union overriding Loyalties to an Employer 
However other cases have suggested that the loyalties to a union should override the 
loyalties owed to an employer, and thus a breach of this duty of loyalty and fidelity 
cannot form a valid reason to take action against an employee union representative.  
One suggestion that has been made is that the duty of loyalty should be suspended in 
situations where it is in conflict with a legitimate trade union activity, which would 
otherwise constitute a breach of this duty.
262   
In Bennett v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission,
263 where Mr Bennett 
had made adverse comments about his employer to the media in his capacity as 
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president of a union after being specifically directed not to by his employer,
264 Finn J 
suggested that the content of the loyalty obligation of such an employee must address 
the explicit dual loyalties which the employee holds.  Mr Bennett was described as 
being in the position of ‘serving two masters whose respective interests in particular 
matters could be antagonistic’.
265 
His Honour noted that the obligation of loyalty and fidelity to an employer does not 
privilege the position of the employer to the exclusion of the union
266 and suggested 
that account needs to be taken of the nature and purpose of any action the employee 
was undertaking, if those actions involved legitimate trade union activities.
267  His 
Honour referred to the case of X v Commonwealth,
268 which held that an employee 
who is unable to carry out duties of loyalty and fidelity due to any mental, emotional 
or physical disability, should be protected by the provisions of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
269  Finn J concludes that, despite these duties of 
loyalty and fidelity, the conduct of an employee who is acting in their trade union 
capacity should not be classified as disloyalty to an employer.
270 
This view is supported by the decision of Finance Sector Union of Australia v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,
271where it was held that adverse 
action taken on the basis of a number of media interviews which the employee gave 
while ‘wearing her FSU ‘hat’’,
272 stating her negative opinion of her workplace was 
in breach of the protections for industrial activities.  
In these cases, it was apparent that the employer made their decision because of 
certain conduct, in both cases because of unfavourable media interviews.  The 
question for the court was whether or not the industrial nature of this conduct could 
be put out of the decision makers’ minds and the employee disciplined on the basis 
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of disloyalty.  What was suggested, particularly in Bennett, was that an industrial act 
should not be classified as disloyalty to an employer. 
(c)  Conclusion 
The law, following the High Court case of Barclay, is that it is possible to put the 
industrial nature of certain acts out of the mind of a decision maker and that the 
employee is still bound to act with regard to their employment contract, company 
policies and duties of loyalty and fidelity.  This supports the view that loyalties to an 
employer will need to be upheld, even during times of industrial activity. 
It is my submission that this reduces certainty for both employees and employers.  A 
decision can be made on the basis of a particular act done in an industrial capacity, 
but the reason for the decision may be held to be either the employee’s failures as an 
employee, or the employee’s industrial activities.  An employer cannot take action in 
these circumstances and be confident that a court will not find them in breach of the 
protective provisions. 
I submit that an act which is classified as an industrial activity should not form the 
basis of a decision to take adverse action against an employee.  The importance of 
protecting employees who undertake the  additional responsibilities of a union 
representative  is  accepted in Australian labour law.
273  If an employee union 
representative is in a position where their union position requires them to do one act 
and their employment position requires them to do a different act, and that employee 
must choose between the two, it is my submission that the objects of the Act can best 
be satisfied if that employee is free to chose to support their union. 
Furthermore, the duty of loyalty to an employer is an implied contractual duty and 
duties arising under an employment contract are contractual, whereas protections 
from adverse action on the basis of union affiliations are statutory.  A statutory 
prohibition should override a common law duty.
274 
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2  Reason / Cause Distinction 
One of the ways that judges have tried to reconcile apparently intertwined reasons for 
acting is by distinguishing between the ‘reason’ for the action and the ‘cause’ of the 
action.  This distinction is used in cases where it is alleged that adverse action was 
taken against an employee because of their rights to a particular industrial instrument 
or award from an industrial body.
275 
The provision was designed to prevent employers victimising employees with rights 
to a particular award, but the reason/cause distinction was established so that an 
employer who could not maintain a profitable business due to the award could 
dismiss their workforce without fear of breaching the Act.
276  In summary, it is 
concluded that the reason for the decision was the high cost of the employees, and 
that the industrial award was simply the cause of that cost.  Its purpose was to protect 
the integrity of the award system, as without it ‘the whole system of industrial 
arbitration would be threatened with destruction’.
277  It has been used by judges to 
prevent ‘consequences sometimes absurd, sometimes oppressive’.
278 
Below, I explore the possibility of applying this test to the whole of the industrial 
activities provision in order to provide assist judges in ascertaining the reason for 
particular decisions, especially in the context of the two contentious areas 
highlighted above: where a union representative is particularly active; and where a 
single act could be classified as the act of a union representative or the act of an 
unsatisfactory employee. 
(a)  The Test 
The most famous and often cited application of this distinction is that of Greater 
Dandenong City Council v Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union
279 
(‘Greater Dandenong’).  In this case, the Greater Dandenong City Council, who had 
been employing their own employees, put out a tender to other companies to provide 
their organisation with employees.  Only two tenders were received, the in-house bid 
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and a bid from Silver Circle.  The Evaluation Committee set up by the Council 
determined that the Silver Circle bid was the most favourable.   
The only major difference between the two bids was the cost of the staff.  In-house 
council staff were employed under a different award than the Silver Circle staff 
would be.  The Silver Circle staff were not entitled to be paid as much as the in-
house staff.  The result of accepting this bid was that the relevant employees of the 
Council would be made redundant and replaced by Silver Circle staff.  It was 
undisputed that in reality, most of the redundant Council staff would become Silver 
Circle staff and perform the exact same task for a lesser rate of pay. 
The question for the Court was this: Did the Council decide to dismiss their 
workforce because of their rights to higher pay under the award?  If they had, then 
they would have breached the protection provisions (by making a decision on the 
basis of their ‘entitlement to an award’).  At first instance, Madgwick J found that the 
Council was motivated by a desire to avoid the industrial instrument and held that the 
Council had breached the Act.
280 
The Full Federal Court (Wilcox, Merkel and Finkelstein JJ) unanimously dismissed 
the Council’s appeal due to a failure to call enough decision makers to discharge 
their onus of proof.  However they found that the primary judge had failed to 
distinguish between the operative (or immediate) reason for the Council’s conduct 
and the cause (or proximate reason) for the conduct.
281 
Merkel J formulated the test as follows: 
… the cases demonstrate that s 298K is not concerned with the cause of the prejudicial 
conduct.  Rather, it is concerned with the employer’s reason or reasons for engaging 
in that conduct.  Thus, there can be a significant difference between the employer’s 
subjective reason for engaging in prejudicial conduct and the objective circumstances 
that led to the employer engaging in the conduct.
282 
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Applied to this case, Merkel J held that while ‘higher entitlements may be causally 
linked to the Council’s acceptance of the Silver Circle tender, the evidence does not 
support the primary judge’s conclusion that they were an operative reason for the 
Council’s acceptance of the tender’.
283 
This test was put by Finkelstein J as this: 
… to decide whether an employee has been unlawfully dismissed, it is necessary to 
ascertain the true motive for, or purpose of, the dismissal.  If there is some legitimate 
reason for the dismissal, such as the desire to avoid bankruptcy or the need to maintain 
a profitable operation, the dismissal will be lawful.  It matters not that the cause of the 
impending bankruptcy or the unprofitable trading is the high rate of wages payable 
under an award or certified agreement.. That is to say, although the benefits produced 
by an award or certified agreement have caused the problem which the employer seeks 
to address, that does not necessarily make those benefits the ‘reason’ or motive for his 
act.
284 
The reason/cause distinction was further analysed in Maritime Union of Australia v 
CSL Australia Pty Ltd
285 (‘MUA v CSL Australia’).  In this case, the owners of the 
vessel CSL Yarra agreed to sell the vessel to a related company, who would operate 
the vessel under a foreign flag and replace the Australian crew with a crew from the 
Ukraine.  The reason cited by the owners of the CSL Yarra was that this would 
enable to vessel to operate as part of the international fleet.  The Australian 
employees claimed that the reason for the decision was that they were entitled to be 
paid at a higher rate (as specified in their industrial instrument) than the Ukrainian 
crew. 
The evidence showed that on more than one occasion, the decision maker had 
considered the price differential of the Australian and Ukrainian crews.  Under cross 
examination, the decision maker admitted that wages and conditions were not 
irrelevant considerations.  However the decision as a whole was considered in a very 
broad context. 
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Branson J considered that the correct way of identifying what an employer’s reason 
or reason was that set out by Merkel and Finkelstein JJ in Greater Dandenong.  His 
Honour stated: 
... I am satisfied that the Company has proved on the balance of probabilities that the 
operative or immediate reason (or perhaps reasons) for the conduct of the Company 
with which this proceeding is concerned was Mr Jones’ desire that each of the CSL 
Pacific and CSL Yarra should have the flexibility to trade as part of the CSL 
International fleet not only on the Australian coast but elsewhere in a cost effective 
way.  I do not doubt, indeed Mr Jones did not deny, that the process of reaching his 
decision that the CSL Yarra should be sold and reflagged, he gave consideration to the 
cost differential between an Australian crew and a foreign crew ... However, it seems 
to me that the fact that the crew of the CSL Yarra were entitled to the protection of the 
industrial instruments, while in part a cause of the decision taken by Mr Jones, was not 
an operative reason for his decision in the sense identified [in Greater Dandenong and 
MUA v Geraldton].
286 
(b)  Discussion 
This test is applied mainly in cases involving alleged breaches of the protective 
provisions relating to employee rights to an industrial instrument.
287  It has been 
rejected in a number of cases regarding the other areas of industrial protection.
288  
However the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Act explicitly included 
reference to the cases of Greater Dandenong and Maritime Union of Australia v 
CSL,  when referring to the fact that Parliament intended to retain existing 
jurisprudence relating to industrial protections.
289 
This distinction was used outside the specific category of rights to an industrial 
instrument in Bayford v Maxxia
290 to rebut the presumption that a decision was made 
for a proscribed reason (specifically a workplace right) used under General 
Protection provisions of the Fair Work Act.  An employee was frequently late for 
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work, but claimed that his lateness was ‘part and parcel’ of his family responsibilities 
and that any decision on this basis would be discriminating against him on the basis 
of his family responsibilities.
291  The employer argued that they were not concerned 
with the cause of his lateness, he was dismissed for being late, as would any other 
employee who was consistently late.  This argument was accepted by Riley FM,
292 
who held that the relevant inquiry was into the reason for his dismissal, which was 
his lateness.  
Most recently, this distinction was rejected by the majority of the Full Federal Court 
in the now overturned decision of Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of 
Technical and Further Education.
293  Their Honours conclude that ‘no distinction is 
to be drawn between the cause of conduct and the reason for the conduct’ because 
the distinction is ‘not helpful’.
294   
Further judicial criticism can be found in the judgement of North J in Australasian 
Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Belandra Pty Ltd,
295 who considered that the 
distinction between cause and reason obscured the facts.
296  His Honour relied on the 
fact that there was no requirement in the Act to make this distinction and the fact that 
the terms ‘reason’ and ‘factor’ had been used interchangeably in General Motors-
Holdens Pty Ltd v Bowling.
297  The distinction was also rejected in Lewis 
Construction Co Pty Ltd v Martin.
298  In this case, the employer dismissed an 
employee in order to counter a campaign which was begun by the employee’s union.  
Gray J
299 rejected the argument that the employee’s union membership was not a 
reason for the decision.
300  His Honour considered that consideration of what was a 
factor in a reason and what made up the reason itself ‘tends to distract from the 
essential question’.
301 
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The strongest academic criticism of this test comes from David Quinn, who argues 
that applying this distinction to all of the protections against industrial activity would 
render the provisions ‘nugatory’.
302  He provides the example that an employer could 
then take adverse action against employees associated with unions on the basis that 
they are more expensive, or do not put the employer first, and then the court, after 
applying the distinction, could not conclude that the action was taken for a 
proscribed reason.
303  The reason was the expense or priorities of that employee.  
The cause of that may have been industrial affiliations or activities, but that can be 
distinguished.  For example, in Maritime Union of Australia v CSL Australia, it was 
held that the employer’s reason was not to avoid these benefits but was the ‘strategic 
advantages’ of not being subject to them.
304 
Therefore a breach of the Act could only be made out if it could be shown that the 
decision was made simply because of the fact that the employee belonged to a union, 
or because they took industrial action, but not because the employer found that 
employee’s union role expensive or disruptive.  However it is these effects which 
will cause the employer the greatest resentment; most employers do not object in 
principle to an employee simply being a member of a union.
305 
In applying this distinction to the two problem areas related to employee union 
representatives, it is clear that this distinction has the potential to be abused.  An 
employee who gives a media interview in their capacity of officer of a union could 
be disciplined or terminated for the reason  that they brought the company into 
disrepute, but that the employee’s role within the union was simply the cause of that 
action.  Furthermore, with particular reference to the example given by David Quinn, 
a restless, disruptive employee who causes considerable annoyance to an employer, 
such as was the case in Cuevas v Freeman Motors Pty Ltd,
306 could be terminated on 
that basis, regardless of the fact that the cause of that annoyance was the fact that the 
employee had been active in supporting the rights of employees in their capacity as 
union representative.   
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This would not further the object of the Act to protect freedom of association.  It in 
fact restricts the provisions to the point where the protection is illusory.  It is my 
submission that this distinction is best restricted to the subcategory of industrial 
protection which protects an employee from adverse action on the basis of their right 
to an industrial instrument or agreement.   
3  Comparator  
Another test which is sometimes used in this context is that of a comparison between 
the action taken against an employee union delegate and the action which would 
have been taken against another employee who had behaved in the same manner but 
did not have any industrial association.  There is however judicial uncertainty as to 
whether this comparative test is appropriate. 
(a)  The Test  
This comparative test was used, for example, in the case of Pearce v W D Peacock.  
The facts of this case were discussed in detail earlier.  In summary, Mr Batchelor was 
dismissed because he was dissatisfied in his employment.  His dissatisfaction became 
apparent to his employer when they were approached by his union with a log of 
complaints.  The Court of Petty Sessions at first instance held that he was dismissed 
because of his dissatisfaction, not because of his industrial affiliations.  This was 
affirmed by the High Court.
307 
Barton J, of the majority made the following statement regarding the relevance of a 
comparison: 
An employee who is dissatisfied with his work and wages may or may not be a unionist.  
Where the dissatisfaction exists it would be absurd to say that a dismissal on that 
account is justified when he is not a unionist but is a contravention of the section in 
question when he is a unionist, and beyond the fact that Batchelor was a member of the 
organization, I do not think there is anything substantial on which it can be said that the 
case is altered because he is a member of the organization.
308 
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A comparator was also used in the more recent case of Lewis v Qantas Airways 
Ltd.
309  In that case, Mr Lewis was dismissed following an incident where his ‘bundy 
card’ (a type of time card) was endorsed at the end of the day by a fellow employee.  
The evidence showed that it was common knowledge in the workplace that this 
misconduct would form the basis for summary dismissal.  He and the fellow 
employee who endorsed the card (Mr Macfarlane) were both dismissed.  It is 
important to note that Mr Macfarlane was not a union representative.  Mr Lewis 
brought an action against his employer claiming that the decision was made for 
reasons which included the fact that he was a union representative who had recently 
participated in an industrial dispute.   
However the employer’s evidence that every breach of the timekeeping policy had 
resulted in dismissal was persuasive.  Their actions were consistent with other 
offences and with their own policy.  Both men had been offered the opportunity to 
explain themselves and declined to do so.  Morling J found that although Mr Lewis 
had caused the company embarrassment with regard to the previous industrial 
dispute, it did not have any effect on the decision that was made.
310  It was highly 
relevant that he was treated the same as another non-union representative.
311  
Thus it is clear that the comparator is being utilised in some cases involving the 
industrial relations protections.  I explore below the possibility that it be made clear 
that a comparison which shows that an employer would have taken the same action 
against any employee who did that particular act will always allow an employer to 
rebut their onus of proof. 
(b)  Discussion 
The question to be resolved is thus, if it can be said that an employer would have 
taken the same action against an employee who did not have union associations, 
should that enable an employer to rebut their onus of proof that the decision was 
made for a prohibited industrial reason?  Should a union representative be treated 
differently than other employees?  The resolution of these questions has the potential 
to benefit both the employee and the employer in different circumstances. 
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It was suggested by the Master Builders’ Association that the requirement for a 
comparative test should be written into the legislation.
312  They argue that the 
practical effect of the protective provisions is that union representatives are being 
subject to a sort of ‘reverse discrimination’, where they are effectively immune from 
any disciplinary action by the employer in circumstances where the same behaviour 
would have reasonably resulted in some form of adverse action. 
The majority in Barclay v the Board of Bendigo Institute of Technical and Further 
Education
313 expressed their disapproval at the use of a comparator.  Their Honours 
considered that there was nothing in the Act to require such a comparison to be taken 
and that the use of a comparator would not be appropriate.
314  This was due to the 
fact that an employee union representative was necessarily different from other 
employees.  They undertook more activities which had the potential to cause 
irritation to management.  As stated in Bowling v General Motors-Holdens Pty 
Ltd,
315 the position of union representative brings employees ‘into the firing line’.
316 
The protections are in place because the law recognises the importance of the role 
played by unions and their employee representatives and acknowledges that in the 
course of their roles they may take actions which are not in the best interests of their 
employer, but are in order to counteract the power imbalance which exists between 
employees and employers.  An employee who refuses to work may reasonably be 
dismissed, but an employee who is on strike in an attempt to secure better wages may 
not be.  An employee who does not promote the company line may be reasonably 
dismissed, but an employee who is actively representing the views of their union, 
which happen to be contrary to the line of the company, may not be.  It is these 
situations where a comparator will not be helpful. 
It is my submission that the comparator is a useful tool which employers may use as 
evidence that they did not take action for a particular reason.  However, it cannot be 
said that in all situations, proving that the same action would have been taken against 
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any other employee would prove on the balance of probabilities that the employer 
did not make a particular decision for a proscribed reason.     65 
 
VII  CONCLUSION 
It is a fundamental premise of Australian labour law, that employees have the right to 
join industrial associations and participate in industrial activities.  This right has been 
continuously reflected in Australian legislation since 1904.  These provisions 
protecting freedom of association serve the purpose of counteracting the power 
imbalance which is inherent in the relationship of employees and employers. 
However, the current freedom of association provisions of the Fair Work Act are not 
operating with sufficient certainty.  This is in part due to the expansion of the two 
legislative categories of industrial activities and adverse action.  However the most 
problematic area of these provisions is in the court’s application of the causal link 
between these two categories.  In particular, there is no mechanism for the court to 
reconcile the dual roles of employees who are also union representatives. 
As has been seen, the expanding category of industrial activities is necessary in light 
of the changing role of unions within Australian labour law.  With the change from a 
primary focus on compulsory conciliation and arbitration to enterprise bargaining 
came a diversification in the roles played by unions.  As such, the breadth of the 
provisions required to protect employees who play a role in these unions has 
necessarily expanded. 
Similarly, the definition of adverse action has expanded to encapsulate a greater 
range of acts which may affect an employee in their employment.  This is a reflection 
of the  fact that the true benefit of work extends beyond mere financial gain to 
personal fulfilment and self respect.  Legislative protection of a broad range of 
actions thus protects employees in the whole of their employment capacity. 
The  difficulty lies in the application of  the causal link between the prohibited 
industrial reasons and the adverse actions taken by employers, when the court needs 
to determine what was in the mind of an employer when they made the decision to 
take adverse action against an employee.  This has most recently been illustrated by 
the series of Barclay decisions.  The test for the court to apply has been settled as the 
subjective test, however objective circumstances can and do operate to vitiate the 
evidence of decision makers.  It is therefore uncertain, especially in light of the dual 
roles of employee union delegates, whether a court will interpret a particular decision 66 
 
as being directed at the employee as a union delegate, or at the employee in their 
employment capacity. 
The result of this uncertainty is that employers are unable to make confident 
decisions relating to their employees and employees with union associations are 
being protected in their employment to the extent that they are ‘untouchable’.  This is 
amplified by the legislative provisions which impose a reverse onus on employers, 
and the requirement that the reason need only be one of multiple reasons.  Together 
with the reverse onus of proof, requirement that the reason need only be one of 
multiple reasons, the unlimited potential award of compensation and six year time 
limit, this has created a serious issue in Australian labour law. 
I submit that there ought to be a method for the courts to reconcile the issue with the 
dual roles of employees who concurrently hold the position of union delegate.  A 
determination which holds that the loyalty an employee owes to their union will 
override their loyalty to the employer in times of industrial activity has the potential 
to provide clarity for both employees and employers.  An employee will be free to 
act in an industrial capacity without fear of adverse action simply on the basis that 
the employer was able to dissociate this industrial capacity from their employment 
capacity when making the decision. 
The reason / cause distinction which is effectively used in freedom of association 
cases involving the specific category of rights to an industrial instrument or award is 
not appropriate to be applied to the whole of protection provisions.  This is due to the 
fact that the application of this test has the potential to render the protections illusory 
by being unduly specific.  An employee union representative who has adverse action 
taken against them because they are more expensive, or more disruptive are being 
treated adversely because of their position.  The object of the Act to preserve the 
rights to freedom of association cannot be satisfied by the imposition of this test. 
The final solution which was discussed was a determination as to whether or not a 
comparator is appropriate when considering why an action was taken.  This test has 
the potential to be helpful in some situations, but not in others.  It is not appropriate 
to recommend this as a test to be applied in all cases, as employee union 
representatives are necessarily different from employees who do not hold industrial 
positions.  This type of comparison may be a useful factor in the court’s decision as 
to what was in the mind of a decision maker, but it should not be determinative. 67 
 
The balance between employees and employers within Australian labour law will 
always, necessarily, involve an element of uncertainty.  However, application of the 
causal link, in light of the breadth of the associated legislative provisions, is too 
tenuous to provide a ‘balanced framework’ for employers and employees.  In 
particular, courts have no mechanism for reconciling the dual capacity of employee 
union representatives.  It is submitted that a determination that an employee cannot 
be disciplined or dismissed for an action undertaken in support of their union, by 
reason of the fact that their union loyalties override their employment loyalties, has 
the potential to increase certainty in this area. 
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